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The Result of a Polygraph Examination 
as an Argument in Criminal Investigation
Th e result of polygraph examination is a testimony put forth by an expert after 
concluding examination on a subject who agreed to undergo the procedure. 
Th e subject of consideration here is only the results acquired in examinations 
conducted as part of criminal investigations, which implies the omission of 
pre-employment examinations, post-conviction sexual oﬀ ender testing (PC-
SOT), and other uses. Moreover, the analysis focuses on only those examina-
tions that ended in indication that the subject of examination was deceptive 
as a result of the expert using one of the comparison question techniques, or 
as a person recognising an event in the case of applying the Concealed Infor-
mation Test (CIT) technique. Nor does the study account for the results of 
inconclusive examinations.
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Th us the result of a polygraph examination R covered by the scope of this ar-
ticle can assume the form of one of two propositions (as proposed in Widacki, 
1982):
R1: Person Ai reacted to the relevant questions in the tests like a subject pro-
viding deceptive answers to these questions, 
or
R2: Person Aj recognises the event pn.
Because R1 and R2 are the testimonies of an expert, who can be called E here, 
it can be said that 
T1: E states that R1,
or
T2: E states that R2.
Because propositions of the R1, R2 (generally: R) type and of the T1, T2 (gener-
ally: T) type are produced for the use of the investigation, one should assume 
that they belong to the mass of evidence. Th is article aims to consider such 
propositions as arguments in the investigation procedure.
In the context of the matter in question, an argument is a certain inferential 
structure composed of a single premise or premises, on whose grounds, with 
the use of appropriate generalisations, the conclusion is deduced. Th e prem-
ise is a particular “basis”, a certain knowledge base that provides grounds for 
performing intellectual operations, in a word: information. Pure information, 
however, is not yet evidence, though it can become such as far as it ﬁ ts being 
used in inferential reasoning, or, in the simplest terms, in indirect inference; 
this “ﬁ tting” being the basic and common feature for all pieces of evidence 
(Twining 2006, p. 438). In our case, this means that pure R1 information is not 
yet evidence, and the interference performed by the investigator, which trans-
forms the result of a polygraph examination into a piece of evidence, has the 
following form: if T1 then R1. Th e same is true about the T2 and R2 propositions 
and the if T1 then R2 inference. It is only recognition of these inferences that 
introduces the propositions R1 or R2 to the mass of evidence (see: Stein 2005, 
p. 35).
An investigation can be interpreted as a multiple, repetitive process of generat-
ing, testing, and justifying various hypotheses explaining the individual ques-
tions in the given matter. Th e conclusion of the proving argument assumes 
the form of a hypothesis which can become a constituent of the description of 
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the given course of events. Hypotheses together make up the crime scenario 
(Braak 2010, p. 18). Before the incorporation of a given hypothesis into the 
main scenario of the event (i.e. that which explains the circumstances of the 
crime best), it needs testing to eliminate the potential false positive which it 
exposes (Bex 2009a, p. 23).
Th us two questions arise: (a) why did E consider the R1 or R2 propositions, and 
(b) what can the role played by the R1 or R2 propositions be in the main sce-
nario of the investigated event?
Th e analysis of the argument from the expert’s opinion was conducted by 
Walton, Reed, and Macango (Walton, Reed, Macango 2010, pp. 14–15) , who 
developed the scheme of Stein’s inference quoted above into the following syl-
logism (using the symbols applied above):
(Major premise) Source E is an expert in the ﬁ eld of polygraph examinations, 
which contains the propositions R1 or R2. (Minor premise) E claims that the 
propositions R1 or R2 are true. (Conclusion) Th e propositions R1 or R2 may 
credibly be considered true.
Th e authors, rightly pointing to the natural readiness to accept experts’ opin-
ions, equally justly write that there are no reasons to consider them infallible 
and omniscient, suggesting at the same time treating the arguments from their 
opinions as defeasible. To facilitate the analysis of such arguments, the authors 
propose a tool composed of six questions, the answers to which will help in 
solving the problem of opinion credibility. In the context analysed here, the 
questions are as follows: (1) how credible is E in the capacity of an expert? 
2) Is E an expert in polygraph examinations? (3) According to E, what do the
propositions R1 or R2 result from? (4) Is E personally a reliable source? (5) Are 
the propositions R1 or R2 coherent with the claims of other experts? (6) Are the 
claims of E based on the mass of evidence?
Questions (1) and (2) refer to the qualiﬁ cations and personal properties of E. 
Th e answer should be sought in ascertaining the certiﬁ cation that the expert 
might have. Th at can for example be a certiﬁ cation issued by the institution 
that employs the expert or by a professional corporation. Th ey can also be 
certiﬁ cates of training completed, scientiﬁ c achievements, etc. Th e answers to 
question (1) can also be sought in the expert’s biography, his or her references, 
and the opinions about the expert in the professional community.
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Question (4) may be interpreted as a problem concerning the quality of the ex-
pert’s work. Primarily, this is about the correctness of the method of polygraph 
examination used. Th erefore, it is worth reiterating that correct and allowed 
in practical use is a method with precision deﬁ ned in an independent and fully 
published study, suﬃ  cient diagnostic value (at least 80% for investigation pur-
poses), and a range of other features (Krapohl 2006, for other quality require-
ments see: Konieczny 2009).
Question (5) is not fully clear. If one assumes that it refers to a polygraph ex-
amination of the same person (persons Ai and Aj), conducted by other experts 
to achieve the same goal, they will either support, much like E, propositions R1 
or R2 (which will entail the use of the communis opinio doctorum principle), or 
if they recognise some other propositions, there will be a dispute. Th e sense of 
such disputes and means of tackling them are described in D. Dwyer (2008). 
If the consistency of the result of polygraph examinations is to concern its 
alignment with other expert opinions, then the case is decided at the stage of 
building a scenario, as discussed below.
Question (6) actually concerns the persuasive skills of the expert, and speciﬁ -
cally whether he or she will be capable of convincing the recipients of his or 
her opinion about the correctness of the inference made on the grounds of the 
materials gathered, primarily the charts acquired while conducting the tests. 
Th e question can be considered a “subquestion” to (3).
Question (3) is deﬁ nitely the most important of the entire set quoted above. It 
concerns the grounds for forming opinions, that is generalisations that allow 
the construction of an argument. If such a generalisation is used in evidence-
based reasoning, it can be deﬁ ned as generalisation on evidence. It allows in-
ference from premises to conclusions, in this way inﬂ uencing the power of the 
given evidence-based argument, and becomes the “cement” bringing the given 
argument together (Bex et al. 2007, p. 146).
According to the deﬁ nition proposed by Anderson, generalisations are general 
claims concerning the way of perceiving the mechanisms in the world sur-
rounding us, human behaviours and intentions, environment, and interactions 
between the environment and individuals (Anderson, Schum, Twining 2005, 
pp. 262–288). Th ey may be based on empirical studies, but can also result from 
everyday experience and/or general common-sense knowledge. Generalisa-
tions cannot be assigned the feature of “certainty”; they are qualiﬁ ed with the 
THE RESULT OF A POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION AS AN ARGUMENT... 127
use of a modal quantiﬁ er, such as “usually”, “often”, “generally”, “sometimes” 
(Schum 1994, pp. 81–82). Yet, as far as they are statements achieved through 
scientiﬁ c procedures, the level of their probability is (or at least should be) 
known. Th e generalisations constructed, which have their modal quantiﬁ er 
provided or whose probability is known, allow potential criticism of their use 
in a speciﬁ c situation, as a scrupulous analysis is a procedure that is equally 
important as the formulation of generalisations (Bex 2009, p. 93). It goes with-
out saying, therefore, that the use of generalisations provides the necessary 
grounds for every step in the complicated chains of evidence reasoning (Bex, 
Koppen, Prakken, Verheij 2010, pp. 127–128).
Generalisations can assume the form of a statement, but also that of a condi-
tional.
Below are examples of generalisations used in polygraph examinations.
(I) “Comparison questions are designed to provide the innocent suspect with 
an opportunity to become more concerned about questions other than the rel-
evant questions, thereby causing the innocent suspect to react more strongly 
to the comparison than to relevant questions” (Ruskin, Honts 2002, p. 7).
Th is statement provides the grounds for a number of various polygraph tech-
niques, known as comparison question techniques. Th eir precision is known 
and may, as is the case with the Utah Zone Comparison Technique, exceed 
90% (Krapohl, 2006). Th is technique leads to propositions of the R1 type.
(II) “If a subject has committed the crime, he or she will be able to distinguish 
the critical item among non-critical items during the polygraph test, while an 
innocent subject will not. When the deceptive subject discovers the critical 
item in the question sequence, speciﬁ c involuntary changes are triggered in 
the autonomic nervous system” (Nakayama 2002, p. 49). 
Th is generalisation provides the grounds for inferring propositions of the R2 
type and provides the grounds for the CIT technique. Its precision is known: 
in laboratory tests it amounts to 82% among both sincere and deceptive peo-
ple; in actual cases it verges on 100% among sincere and deceptive people. It is 
contained between 60% and 90% (McCloughan 2006). Th e generalisation can 
be used in practice, but it can also be criticised quite fundamentally (Koniec-
zny 2009, pp. 84–85).
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Not every generalisation known in the ﬁ eld of polygraph examinations has its 
probability deﬁ ned as well as (I) and (II). In the following case, even the modal 
quantiﬁ er is little known:
(III) Th e electrodermal recording might lack responsiveness and in some cases 
be totally devoid of responsiveness due to the examinee’s ingestion of a drug 
or meditation which has anti-muscarinic properties such as antipsychotic and 
antidepressant meditations” (Matte 1996, p. 175).
Although necessary during the evidential reasoning, generalisations can be 
dangerous for the correctness of reasoning, especially when they are not ex-
pressed directly and are undeﬁ ned in reference to the scope, level of abstrac-
tion, modal quantiﬁ er, empirical enforceability, and generally, their power 
(Twining 2006, pp. 334–335). Th is is why a procedure that is equally impor-
tant to their use is their critical testing to minimise the related threats. Th is 
can be achieved through a simple test proposed by Anderson, Schum, and 
Twining. It comprises 12 questions divided into two categories, depending on 
their generalisation being expressed directly or remaining hidden. In the case 
of an articulated generalisation its precision and equivalence are studied and 
attempts are made to adjust the model coeﬃ  cient/index, while in the case of 
a hidden generalisation attempts are made to “portray” and reconstruct it by 
the formulation of its convincing version, and later test it just like in the case 
of generalisations expressed directly (Anderson, Schum, Twining 2005, pp. 
279–280).
To keep things ordered, let us also add that the generalisation itself is not suf-
ﬁ cient to perform a proper evaluation of a polygraph examination, as there are 
also other factors that are decisive for the correctness of that action (Widacki, 
2011).
Let us now assume that the result of a polygraph examination provided the 
grounds for formulating hypotheses in the main scenario of the event inves-
tigated. Possible, then, are three ways of criticising (conﬂ icting) such an argu-
ment: an attack on the conclusion, an attack on the premises, and an attack on 
the rule of inference used in the argument (Braak 2010, p. 28).
Th ese options are illustrated in the chart below:
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Premise
1
2
Conclusion Conclusion
Conclusion
Premise
Premise
Premise
Conclusion
Premise
UNDERCUT
3
ATTACK ON THE 
PREMISE 
ARGUMENT
REBUTTAL
Fig. 1. Ways of attacking arguments
Source: S. van den Braak (2010), Sense-making software for crime analysis, SIKS Dissertation 
Series No. 2010-12, Universiteit Utrecht
Th e arguments that originated while using defeasible reasoning where – despite 
the correctness of the premises – the conclusion achieved on such grounds 
can be false, as the premises guarantee only a certain degree of certainty to 
the conclusion, can be conﬂ icted by the ﬁ rst and third means of attack, that is, 
respectively, rebuttal of an argument by a counter argument with an opposite 
conclusion, and an attack on the rule of the conclusion, by negating its use in 
the given circumstances (undercutting); this does not mean that the conclu-
sion in the argument attacked is false, but only that it is not suﬃ  ciently justi-
ﬁ ed by its premises (Bex, Prakken, Reed, Walton 2003, p. 138).
A practical (and actually occurring) case of such a situation can be conducting 
fewer tests during an examination than required by the procedure for the giv-
en technique: for example, in the stead of three envisaged tests of comparative 
questions, an expert conducts only one, explaining the situation later as due 
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to lack of time or orders from a superior (an actual case known to the author). 
Another example can be the questioning of the rule of inference by proving 
(after CIT technique examination) that the examinee knew the details of the 
event investigated from a source other than participation in the event.
After ascertaining which of the arguments is stronger than the other, their 
dialectical status can be established (Prakken 2004, p. 5). Th is concerns the 
interaction between arguments and counterarguments. In this sense, three 
types of status of arguments can be distinguished: justiﬁ ed argument, that is 
one that triumphs when faced with counterarguments; overruled argument, 
namely one that loses such a “battle”; and the last, neutral – i.e. a defensible 
argument which “draws”, leaving the “battle” of arguments inconclusive (Prak-
ken, Sartor 2009, p. 233).
For example, if we assume that argument R1 is for some reason stronger than 
the argument from the explanation of Ai, who does not plead guilty, the for-
mer can be deﬁ ned as justiﬁ ed, and the latter as overruled. Signiﬁ cantly, the 
testing of the dialectical status of the arguments can be conducted only after 
the majority of them have been generated in a case, which means that various 
interactions may be perceived between them (Braak 2010, p. 28).
A signiﬁ cant phenomenon in this context is the so-called reinstatement of an 
argument (Bex, Verheij 2009c, p. 171). Even if for some reasons we prefer the 
argument provided by E, it can be overruled by a new argument containing 
one of the following conclusions: the expert who issued a polygraph opinion 
is not credible, he misinterpreted the results, etc. In this way, this new ar-
gument may “reinstate” the argument taken up by the examinee (refusal to 
claim guilty), which was initially considered overruled. Th e phenomenon of 
reinstatement, let us reiterate, corroborates the requirement that – to be able 
to consider the mutual interactions between the arguments – all the relevant 
proof and information available in the case must be acquired, which will allow 
the ﬁ nal evaluation of the dialectic status of the arguments.
Closing, let us cite the so-called abductive practical reasoning scheme pro-
posed in a work by Bex, Bench-Capon, and Atkinson (Bex, Bench-Capon, At-
kinson 2009b, pp. 81–86). Th e scheme has the following form:
Conducting of actions A serves the attainment of goal G. Th us, person P has 
the goal G. Hence, person P should embark on action A.
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Th e signiﬁ cance of such reasoning may be refuted by the “discovery” that there 
is a better way of reaching goal G. Th en action A and the previous inference 
will be challenged, which will allow the construction of successive arguments 
(Bex, Verheij 2009c, p. 173). It is easy to notice that if G marks the discovery 
of a criminal by the person P conducting the investigation, and A the use of an 
investigation method that remains ineﬃ  cient in the given case, then the idea 
of conducting a polygraph examination may dawn to P, which will bring more 
beneﬁ t than persevering with method A, as it will allow the acquisition of new, 
relevant information, expansion of the pool of arguments, and – most prob-
ably – approaching, if not attainment, of the goal.
Conclusions
Th is essay is only a very small step towards involving the conceptual appara-
tus of contemporary methodological investigation modelling in the context 
of polygraph examination. Nevertheless, it seems that even such a small ex-
ample of the possibility of looking at polygraph examinations from the angle 
of the modern theory of argumentation seems useful for a number of reasons. 
It provides notions that make it easier to note the problems and consider them 
critically, allows the identiﬁ cation of weak points in reasoning, and primarily 
allows gaps to be found in the existing knowledge and the directions of its ex-
pansion to be pointed to.
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